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ABSTRACT 
The size of government expenditure in an economy grows over time. To 
finance these expenditures, public incomes must grow as well. Given that tax 
revenues are not sufficient for such spending and levying new taxes and/or 
increasing current tax rates are not politically desirable, the only option left is to 
borrow. The purpose of this paper is to survey the two most important approaches, 
“crowding out hypothesis” and “Ricardian Equivalence proposition”, in the 
literature, and evaluate the economic consequences of public borrowing. 
 
Key Words: Crowding out, Crowding in, Ricardian Equivalence, Government 
expenditure, Public borrowing. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is historically known fact that government role in the economy 
has been questioned in one way or the other ever since it came into 
existence. In a socialist economy, the role of government is very high; 
almost every economic activity is planned by central government planning 
institutions and it is implemented accordingly. No private sector in such 
economy theoretically may be allowed to operate. In a capitalist economy, 
on the other hand, government’s role in the economy is very limited. 
Almost every economic activity left to the private sector except a few 
fundamental services, namely, education, healthcare, justice, police 
services, and national defense. Thus, to do these functions, government 
must have sufficient resources.   
There are mainly three sources that every government uses to 
finance its activities. They are taxes, printing money and borrowing. 
Historically and practically, tax revenues are the main sources of 
government expenditures. If tax revenues are equal to government 
expenditures no problem exists at all. 
However, for one reason or the other, government expenditures 
often exceed its tax revenues, and therefore the excess spending must be 
financed. Assuming government will not reduce it’s spending, then there 
are three sources available to finance this deficit: by levying new taxes or 
rising the existing tax rates, printing money, or borrowing. Since it is 
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politically hard and undesirable to raise the tax rates or levy new tax, and 
since the printing money option to finance this excess spending is not 
desirable for fear of leading high inflation. It is the borrowing option that 
available for a government to finance this extra spending (deficit). 
It is, therefore, the borrowing option that has been extensively 
studied to see if there exists any negative impact on the economy as a 
consequence of using it to finance deficit. In this paper, I will examine the 
two main views, crowding-out hypothesis and Ricardian equivalence 
proposition, and review empirical evidence in the literature to see which 
one of these supported by empirical studies. 
 
2. THE THEORY 
Government spending generally exceeds the tax revenues, 
therefore, this excess spending is called budget deficit. To finance the 
deficit, government usually chooses to borrow. Since there are limited 
amount of funds available in the economy, it is logical to think that 
government borrowing will have some effect on the private sector. Thus, 
our objective is to see what impact does government borrowing (excess 
spending) have on the private sector, namely, private investment. 
There are mainly two views in the literature that provides 
theoretical basis. They are “crowding out hypothesis” and “Ricardian 
equivalence proposition”. 
 
3. CROWDING-OUT HYPOTHESIS 
The public debt issue has always been a hot subject of theoretical 
economists, empirical economists as well as political economists and 
scientists (Boskin, 1987, 255). Despite this popularity, “the effect of 
government debt and deficits on the economy is not obvious from either 
economic theory or statistical evidence” (Seater, 1993, 142). There always 
has been more than one view about the public debt’s effect on the 
economy. Those who claim that there has to be some government debt 
effects on private sector support the crowding out hypothesis. Those who 
claim that no government debt has net effect on private sector, support 
Ricardian equivalence proposition. 
It is important to note that under the assumption that government 
borrows to finance the deficit is subject of crowding out, and Ricardian 
equivalence proposition. We are not considering an increase in 
government spending effect that financed by either taxes or printing 
money or any combination of them. Therefore, the central issue about 
crowding out hypothesis and Ricardian equivalence proposition is that 
government finances its budget deficit by borrowing from private sector.  
In general crowding out “refers to the displacement of private 
economic activity by public economic activity” (Buiter, 1990, 163). For 
our purpose, we can simplify the definition as follows: reduction in the 
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amount of private investment caused by government borrowing from 
private sector.  
To understand the crowding out effect I use figures that cover all 
possible combinations. 
In explaining crowding out hypothesis graphically, it is assumed 
that private investment is only a function of interest rate, I=I(r). The 
relationship is negative: as interest rate decreases more and more 
investment projects are profitable to undertake. It is also assumed that 
saving is either positively related to interest rate so that an increase in the 
rate of return to saving will increase private saving or insensitive to rate of 
return so that change in rate of return will have no effect on saving. 
Mathematically, S=S(r), S’(r) > 0 and S=S0, respectively. 
Figure 1 illustrates the first case where I=I(r), S=S(r), I’(r) < 0, 
and S’(r)>0. Government debt issue in size ∆D causes interest rate to 
increase from r0 to r1. Increase in interest rate causes private investment to 
decrease from I0 to I1, and therefore, this reduction in private investment, 
I0-I1 = -∆I, has been called partial crowding out of deficit financing. It is 
partial because the amount of crowding out of private investment is less 
than the amount of government debt issue, -∆I < ∆D. The reason would be 
that increase in interest rate (rate of return on saving) increases saving and 
therefore, increased portion of saving offsets corresponding amount of 
private investment reduction. 
If S=So that saving is not a function of interest rate, in another 
words, change in interest rate does not change saving, then we have 
complete crowding out effect as shown in figure 2. 
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In this extreme case, saving is assumed to be insensitive to 
interest rate, then the same amount of government debt issue, ∆D, causes 
interest rate to increase from r0 to r1. However, since saving is insensitive 
to interest rate, saving level will remain the same, S1 = S0, and thus 
government debt, will crowd out private investment by the same amount, 
∆D = -∆I.  In this case we have full or complete crowding out that the 
amount of government borrowing completely displaces the same amount 
of private investment. 
This extreme case could occur. For instance “in an open economy 
with a freely floating exchange rate and facing perfect international capital 
mobility, crowding out is complete” (Buiter, 1990, 74). The reason would 
be that “A bond-financed tax cut stimulates domestic spending but also 
induces a nominal and real exchange rate appreciation which crowds out 
net exports by a matching amount, leaving aggregate demand unaltered” 
(Buiter, 1990, 74). 
Moreover, we have seen in both figures that we have crowding 
out effect on the theoretical basis. Buiter claims that “some degree of 
direct crowding out is definitely a theoretical and practical possibility-
along each of the many dimensions. …The degree of crowding out along 
each dimension is an empirical matter that will have to be settled if 
accurate policy-oriented models are to be constructed” (Buiter, 1990, 179).  
     Figure 1: Partial Crowding Out Case
r S
Increase in
r1 G. Debt
r0
  I+G.Debt
            Dec. in
I    I
           I1        I0=S0     S1 S, I
        Crowding out = I0 - I1
         I = I ( r ), S = S ( r ) 
 5 
 
 
Therefore, it is the subject of empirical studies to validate the 
hypothesis. I will review some of the important empirical results in the 
empirical section. 
 There is another possibility that may occur. If we assume that 
private investment demand is insensitive to the rate of interest, I = I0, then, 
there would have no crowding out. Figure 3 illustrates this possibility. 
Here we also assume that S = S( r ), and S’( r )>0. Issuing government 
debt of size ∆D causes interest rate to go up from r0 to r1. Because of 
insensitivity nature of private investment demand schedule, no change in 
private investment occurs, ∆I = 0. Thus, there is no crowding out effect of 
government borrowing, everything else held constant. 
One last extreme theoretical case would also lay within the 
possibility. That is, assuming the private investment function is not only 
sensitive to the rate of interest but it also depends positively on income 
level. Symbolically, new investment function is I = I( r, y ),  assuming I’( r 
) < 0, and I’( y )> 0. Given that S = S ( r ), and S’ ( r ) > 0, then, effect of 
government borrowing positively alters the private investment, called 
“crowding in” effect. Figure 4 illustrates this case. Before government 
borrowing, point a represents the investment and saving equilibrium at the 
rate of interest r0. Issuing debt in size of ∆D causes interest rate increase to  
Figure 2: Complete Crowding Out Case
         S
r           Increase
             in G. Debt
r1
I+G.Debt
r0
      Decrease in
      Investment
          I
  I1      I0=S0=S1 S, I
Decrease in Private Investment=Increase in Government Debt
S = S0, I = I ( r )
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r1. This reduces private investment, and point b shows the new 
equilibrium. At this point, the income effect enters into equation. Issuing 
∆D results higher income level which, in turn, affect private investment 
positively, implying a new equilibrium point at c. Thus, government 
borrowing, ∆D, through dynamic nature of multiplier, causes a high level 
of private investment, an increase of I0-I2. This is so called “crowding in” 
effect of government deficit. 
 
4. RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE PROPOSITION 
To see the opposite view that there is no crowding out effect, 
which is based on Ricardian Equivalence proposition, figure-5 is 
illustrated. Before explaining the figure, the general concept of the 
Ricardian Equivalence should be introduced. The terms “Ricardian 
Equivalence” was first given by Buchanan (1976) when he stated a close 
relationship between David Ricardo’s work and Barro’s proposition.  
When economists do not agree with other economists on a theory, 
they generally develop a new theory or model and test it empirically. 
Since government debt has many other consequences along with crowding 
out effect, Robert Barro (1974), along with many other economists, does  
 
           Figure 3: No Crowding Out Case
r
         I             I+G. Debt S
r1
r0 Increase in
G. debt
      I0=S0        I+G S, I
No change in Investmant, no crowding out.
S = S ( r ) I = I0
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not believe that government debt would result net wealth. Hence, he 
developed a model to deal with this issue. In his famous article Barro 
(1974) developed a model to show that government bonds are not net 
wealth. In his model, he goes into more technical detail and makes a 
number of assumptions to theoretically prove the Ricardian equivalence 
proposition. He concludes that “there is no persuasive theoretical case for 
treating government debt, at the margin, as a net component of perceived 
household wealth” (Barro, 1974, 1116).  
Canto and Rapp (1982) summarize Barro’s view, Ricardian 
equivalence proposition, in a simple example that “suppose the 
government reduces the current tax bill of every taxpayer by one dollar 
and finances this tax reduction by issuing bonds which bear the market 
rate of interest. A lump-sum tax equal to one dollar plus interest will be 
levied on each taxpayer next year in order to retire the current bond issue. 
Will taxpayers feel wealthier today as a result of this transaction? Will 
Figure 4: Crowding In case
       Increase in I
Since Inc. in Income         S
r
         b
r1
           c
   a
r0
Increase in
G. Debt
          Dec.
            in I
            I1         I2 I+G.Debt
        I1 I0=S0  I2    S2 S, I
Crowding in=I2-I0, S = S ( r ),    I = I ( r,Y)
Increase r implies going from a to b.
Increase in Y implies a shift from I1 to I2 which 
implies going from b to c.
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they therefore increase their consumption and lower private capital 
accumulation?” (Canto and Rapp, 1982, 33). 
They say if people behave rationally, the answer is no. People 
will save the dollar they currently receive so as to be able to meet their 
increased future tax liabilities. As a result, current saving will increase by 
the amount of the government debt issue, ∆S = ∆D. Hence, they conclude 
that private capital accumulation will not be crowded out. Therefore, 
Ricardian equivalence proposition essentially uses rational expectations 
approach to explain the issue. 
Figure 5 illustrates the Ricardian equivalence proposition. The 
only difference in figure 5 is a rightward shift in saving function. Since 
this rightward saving shift is equal to government debt issue, ∆S = ∆D, no 
crowding out occurs. Under this view, there is no change both in rate of 
return, r, and in private investment.  
According to this view, crowding out can be avoided only if the 
private sector takes complete account of the future tax liabilities implied 
by government bonds, and thus regards these bonds as a substitute for 
claims on physical capital (Canto and Rapp, 1982, 35). Ricardian 
equivalence is unlikely to hold. There are many scholars who argue that 
the assumptions that the equivalence is based are unrealistic. Buiter, in this 
respect, expresses that “the possible neutrality of public debt and deficits 
is little more than a theoretical curiosum” (Buiter, 1990, 73). 
 
 
Figure 5: No Crowding Out: Ricardian Equivalence Case
r
               S0
  S1
            Increase in
          G. debt
r0=r1
            Shift in
         Saving
            I 
       I0=S0                     S1     S, I
Increase in Government Debt = Increase in Saving
No Changes in Interest Rate and Investment
This figure is adopted from Canto and Rapp (1982, 34).
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Since the assumptions of Ricardian equivalence proposition have 
severely been criticized on both theoretical and empirical ground, there 
have been some researchers who clam that the equivalence proposition 
approximately holds. Seater states that “Theoretically, we can be almost 
certain that Ricardian equivalence is not literally true: it simply requires 
too many stringent conditions to be believable. Nevertheless, equivalence 
appears to be a good approximation” (Seater, 1993, 184). He concludes his 
article by stating, “Empirical success and analytical simplicity make 
Ricardian equivalence an attractive model of government debt’s effects on 
economic activity” (Seater, 1993, 184). See surveys on this topic done (by 
Seater, 1993; and by Bernheim, 1987). 
 
5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Since the crowding out hypothesis is related with less or more of 
each of the variables that saving, private investment, public debt, budget 
deficit, interest rates, and credit market, many scholars have examined 
different aspects of the issue. It is not subject of this study to review all the 
studies but most important studies in the relevant literature. 
In less developed and developing countries, credit markets may 
not be developed well enough so that government borrowing in these 
countries can hurt private investment more severely than it would be in 
developed market economies. 
There is an empirical study that examines this aspect. 
Specifically, Gochoco argues that less developed countries have 
underdeveloped capital markets and the crowding out effect would be 
higher in these countries (Gochoco, 1990, 331). In her paper, she tests 
crowding out effect for Philippines. She points out that “whether bond-
financed deficits result in a “crowding out” effect or not is an empirical 
question” (Gochoco, 1990, 331). She further argues that  “crowding out is 
believed to be relevant in LDCs” (Gochoco, 1990, 331). She uses Huang 
(1986) methodology to estimate the crowding out effect. Her test results 
indicate “The ‘crowding out’ effect is relevant in the case of the 
Philippines” (Gochoco, 1990, 333). She, therefore, concludes “in LDCs 
with underdeveloped capital markets, government issuance of debt can 
add to wealth. The inability of countries like the Philippines to finance 
budgetary deficits via money creation because of fears of inflation, or via 
borrowing from abroad given the external debt overhang, means that 
‘crowding out’ will remain a problem. The resulting high interest rates, 
above that due to the removal of interest ceilings may interfere with 
reforms in other areas. High interest rates may lead to capital inflows 
which could rise the value of the domestic currency and derail export 
expansion efforts” (Gochoco, 1990, 333). 
It might be more thoughtful to see direct relationship between 
government deficit and interest rate. Canto and Rapp (1982) have 
examined this empirically. They try to find direct relationship between 
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budget deficit and interest rate. Moreover, their approach is somewhat 
different from the others in formulating and testing the relationship. They 
performed two tests to determine what effect, if any, changes in the budget 
deficit have on interest rates (Canto and Rapp, 1982, 35). These tests are 
Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) tests. Based on Granger test their  
“empirical results indicated that increasing budget deficits were not 
necessarily associated with increased interest rates. There was no 
conclusive evidence that information on changes in past budget deficits 
combined with changes in past interest rates provided more accurate 
forecasts of changes in current interest rates than information on past 
interest rates alone” (Canto and Rapp, 1982, 36). 
Based on Sims test they find that “changes in the “current year’s” 
budget deficit had no statistically significant association with changes in 
future interest rates taken as a group” (Canto and Rapp, 1982, 36). They 
also used these two tests to determine if interest rate increases can explain 
increases in deficit. The results indicate that “an increase in interest rates 
contributes to a larger budget deficit through higher interest expense in the 
future” (Canto and Rapp, 1982, 37). 
Over all they conclude that “Budget deficits have not been a 
consistently accurate predictor of interest rates. Changes in interest rates 
cannot be shown to have caused changes in real budget deficits. Changes 
in interest rates have, however, partially explained changes in nominal 
budget deficit (Canto and Rapp, 1982, 37)”.  
They do not state explicitly whether their results support the 
crowding out hypothesis. Based on their test, they conclude, “using the 
past as our guide, the relationship between deficits and interest rates has 
not been a consistent one” (Canto and Rapp, 1982, 37). 
However, in another study, Boskin (1987) states in his article that 
“Increases in deficits do indeed lead to an increase in interest rates” 
(Boskin, 1987, 273). So he finds the crowding out effect. 
Dwyer also investigates the relationship between interest rates 
and deficits. He concludes, “No evidence is found that larger government 
deficits increase interest rates” (Dwyer, 1982, 327).  
Like Dwyer, Makin tests for crowding out and found no evidence 
(Makin, 1983, 382). 
One other possibility to examine is to test both hypotheses 
together. Gupta (1992), for instance, tests both crowding out hypothesis 
and Ricardian equivalence proposition for developed countries. After 
introducing crowding out and the equivalence proposition, Gupta lists the 
assumptions of Ricardian equivalence proposition.  They are; (1) Capital 
markets are perfect with no constraints on borrowing by consumers, (2) 
Taxes are non-distortionery, (3) Economic agents are fully aware about 
the path of future fiscal policies, and (4) Both public and private sectors 
have equal planning horizons (Gupta, 1992, 19). 
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Then he mentions that violations of one or more of these assumptions 
could lead to deviations from the equivalency proposition. He uses 
Aschauer’s (1985) model to test these two hypotheses. The variables that 
he uses are in real per capita terms and the time period covered is from 
1960 to 1985, for ten developing countries in Asia (Gupta, 1992, 20). 
The evidence he finds on crowding out hypothesis is that 
“government expenditure is a poor substitute for private expenditure so 
that even if the mode of financing is irrelevant, government expenditures 
can be expected to exercise significant expansionary effects on aggregate 
demand in the countries in the sample. This evidence thus refutes the 
alleged fears about massive crowding out effects in these countries” 
(Gupta, 1992, 25). For the Ricardian equivalence proposition, he finds that 
it holds for some countries, and does not hold for others (Gupta, 1992, 25). 
Plosser (1982) also studied crowding out hypothesis. He develops 
a model under rational expectations approach, and tests the crowding out 
hypothesis. His results find no significant relationship between deficits 
and interest rates. 
Since we assume theoretically that increase in government debt 
causes interest rates to increase, it gives us more insights to study what 
determines interest rates. Even though there might many determinants, we 
could examine for our purposes to see if deficit is an important 
determinant of interest rates. 
There is a small handy book written by Davit T. King (1990) who 
examines this interest rate determination and links it to crowding out 
hypothesis. He points out that “interest rates are determined in the 
financial sector by (a) the interaction of the borrowing and lending plans 
of the sector’s “outside” the financial sector and (b) central bank actions 
affecting bank liquidity “inside” the financial sector” (King, 1990, 21). He 
distinguishes between outside and inside interest rate determination by 
stating “outside interest rate determination refers to changes in financial 
supply and demand initiated by changes in borrowing and lending plans of 
the real sector. Inside interest rate determination refers to changes within 
the financial sector brought about by central bank policy, which then 
influence the real sectors’ borrowing and lending” (King, 1990, 21). He, 
then, links the interest rate determination and the crowding out hypothesis. 
He states “the validity of the credit market pressure model of interest rate 
determination is important to the crowding out issue. Crowding out 
commonly refers to credit market pressure created by excessive 
government borrowing” (King, 1990, 23). Based on his study, he claims 
that “in fact, the conditions for crowding out have never existed in modern 
U.S. economic history: whenever the government borrowing requirement 
was high, the private sector borrowing requirement was low, and vice 
versa. However, in 1983 for the first time in the postwar era, both 
government and private borrowing as a percent of GNP increased at the 
same time. And the government-borrowing requirement is projected to 
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stay at unprecedented levels even as private sector borrowing continues to 
grow with economic expansion in 1984-89” (King, 1990, 23-24). 
Therefore, he says crowding out is unlikely to happen. His 
approach to the problem is a very different way from the existing literature 
in this area. Since he just look at borrowing requirement and interest rate. 
Feldstein and Eckstein (1970) have undertaken one of the 
comprehensive studies. They actually investigated the fundamental 
determinants of the interest rate (Feldstein and Eckstein, 1970, 363). They 
state “Because government debt is a relatively close substitute in 
portfolios for corporate bonds, an increase in the quantity of government 
debt that must be absorbed by the public would be expected to raise the 
bond interest rate” (Feldstein and Eckstein, 1970, 367). Based on their 
test, they found that “changes in the outstanding public debt can have an 
important impact on the corporate bond rate. …If real interest rate is 4.0 
per cent, this implies an elasticity of the real rate with respect to the 
government debt of 0.7” (Feldstein and Eckstein, 1970, 367). Hence, they 
found a positive link between interest rate and government debt, which 
support the existence of the crowding out effect. 
Bradley approach to the problem is also different from the others 
in the sense that he initially accept the crowding out effect, but he tries to 
find the main causes that results crowding out effect. More specifically, he 
asks the question that “government spending or deficit financing: which 
causes crowding out?” (Bradley, 1986, 203). Actually, he claims that there 
is confusion about the direct effects of government spending and indirect 
effect of how that spending is financed (Bradley, 1986, 203). He uses a 
simple dynamic model and finds that “increases in the stock of 
government bonds, by themselves, do not force up interest rates. When the 
debt increase is caused by a rise in spending however, we find, after a lag, 
both interest rates and monetary aggregates rise” (Bradley, 1986, 204). As 
a result, his empirical results also show that there is crowding out. 
However, he claims that it exists because of large government spending. 
It is sometimes a good idea to find out what policy makers or 
businessmen think about this issue. President John J. Balles of the San 
Francisco Bank thinks “…private demands for credit would somehow get 
squeezed out, and interest rates would rise to astronomical levels” (cited in 
Weintraub, 1978, 360). 
 Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) tests Ricardian equivalence 
proposition and found inconclusive results while Stanley (1998) came up 
with strong empirical evidence against the proposition.  
 Some researcher looked at the issue in a different angle by 
viewing a consumer’s intertemporal maximization point. These scholars 
found support for the equivalence proposition (Evans, 1988; Haque, 1988; 
Haug, 1990).   
 One resent study mainly emphasized testing Ricardian 
proposition by using US data from 1980 to 1995. This study done by 
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Wheeler (1999) and found strong empirical evidence to support extreme 
case of the proposition.  
More recently, Ricciuti (2003) emphasized the role of the 
permanent income hypothesis and the intertemporal government budget 
constraint in testing the Ricardian proposition (53). His conclusion shed 
light to the future researcher as he recommend “…we have tried to 
demonstrate that this debate is far from having achieved a univocal 
conclusion. A new wave of work, mainly empirical but also theoretical, is 
needed in the field.” 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
As Mankiw expresses, economics science is incomplete. There 
are many unanswered issues as well as controversies that have not yet 
been solved. Crowding out hypothesis, unfortunately, among those issues. 
Although there have been enormous theoretical and empirical studies on 
this subject, no agreement has been reached. 
As we have reviewed some of the important theoretical and empirical 
studies in this paper, we see that some researchers conclude that there is 
crowding out while some do not. Similarly, some study find support for 
Ricardian Euivalence proposition while some do not. 
I think the problem seems to be empirical. The difficulty arises of 
constructing the model, measuring the relevant variables, as well as the 
availability of relevant data. Assumptions that are used in studies are also 
important factors. Nature of the credit and money markets, interest 
elasticities of investment and saving are all factors that affect the test 
results. This study concludes, therefore, that government budget deficit 
crowds out private investment through its effect on interest rates. While 
complete crowding out is only a theoretical possibility, partial crowding 
out is likely, and its magnitude or degree depends upon interest elasticities 
of saving and investment, and nature of the credit and money markets as 
well as the place of economy in the business cycles. 
Future research direction should be to construct models that grasp 
the reality and flexible enough to include all relevant variables to 
empirically test the both hypotheses. 
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